In this paper we illustrate the role of cross-border mergers in the process or corporate governance convergence. We explore in detail the corporate governance provisions in Rhône-Poulenc, a French company, and Hoechst, a German firm, and the resulting structure after the two firms merged in 1999 to create Aventis, legally a French corporation. We show that, despite the nationality of the firm, the corporate governance structure of Aventis is a combination of the corporate governance systems of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc, where the newly merged firm adopted the most protective provisions of the two merging firms. In some cases this resulted in Aventis' borrowing from the corporate governance structure of Hoechst while in others Aventis replicated Rhône-Poulenc's structure. Most interesting is the situation where Aventis introduced improved provisions over both systems. The resulting corporate governance system in Aventis is significantly more protective than the default French legal system of investor protection.
Introduction
The extant corporate governance literature, pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 Porta et al. ( , 2000 Porta et al. ( , and 2002 ), provides strong evidence that countries with a common law system protect investors better than countries with civil law. Better protection translates into more valuable firms (La Porta et al., 2002) , and more developed financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997) , at least since the end of the Second World War (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . Once a "better" corporate governance system has been recognized, the natural question becomes whether and how countries converge towards that system. Gilson (2000) identifies three kinds of corporate governance convergence: functional, formal, and contractual convergence. Functional convergence occurs when institutions are flexible enough to respond to demands by market participants and no formal change in the rules is necessary. Formal convergence occurs when a change in the law forces the adoption of best practices. Finally, contractual convergence occurs when firms change their own corporate governance practices by committing to a better regime, possibly because the legal system lacks flexibility or laws cannot be changed.
The evidence on functional and formal convergence is mixed. An example of functional convergence is the creation of new exchanges in Europe, which give investors the protection that the law does not provide. 2 At the same time, Gilson (2000) also recognizes the limits of functional convergence More generally, Cabolis (2002 and show that accountability and transparency is valued by shareholders and therefore, improvements in both dimensions through cross-border mergers imply a substantial premium. However, Bris and Cabolis (2004) show that, higher merger premia in cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic acquisitions are significant in acquisitions where the acquiror buys 100 percent of the target. This is because according to international law, a 100 percent acquisition by a company from a foreign country results in a change of nationality for the target, and therefore a change in the law that protects shareholders.
An important point to be emphasized is that corporate law provides the minimum standards that a firm must comply with, in order to be legally operational. However, nothing precludes merging firms to adopt stricter rules than the ones prescribed in the law. Indeed, the anecdotal evidence we provide above points to situations where firms opt to more austere practices than the ones imposed by the relevant corporate law. Because the contractual arrangements between the merging parties are cumbersome, it is useful to study in detail the corporate governance structures resulting from a particular merger. In this paper we describe and analyze the 1999 merger between the French firm Rhône-Poulenc and the German firm Hoechst that resulted in the creation of Aventis, a new entity domiciled in France.
Our paper describes a case of corporate governance convergence through a cross-border merger where the resulting entity is more protective of shareholders than the two original firms, and where the new entity improves the default legal system prescribed in the national Corporate Code.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we outline why we study the case of Aventis and we briefly present our results. In Section 3, we describe the merging companies, Rhône-Poulenc and Finally, the two merging parties come from countries with different legal origins, following the definition in La Porta et al. (1998) . However, the two merging parties come from countries with similar institutional characteristics, economic development, and financial markets. Furthermore, both France and Germany are members of the European Union and the European Monetary System. Thus, some aspects of the deal that are usually relevant in other cross-border mergers are not challenging here: combination of different markets, exchange rate considerations, and the domicile of the newly created firm. However, one of the major difficulties in the deal was the integration of the managerial cultures in the two firms.
The case is a good example of a merger where the design of governance rules facilitated the integration of the two different managerial cultures.
Aventis is legally a French corporation. In this paper we show that, despite the nationality of Aventis, its corporate governance structure combines the corporate governance systems of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc. Indeed, Aventis borrowed some features of the Hoechst governance system that were more protective to investors than the respective provisions in the Rhône-Poulenc corporate governance code. Interestingly, we document that both companies operated under stricter corporate governance rules than the ones dictated by their respective national corporate laws. Aventis' corporate governance in turn, was designed combining, not the national corporate laws in both countries-the systems by default-but the stricter rules of the two companies.
We specifically study two main characteristics of the Aventis code of corporate governance: the organization of the Board of Directors, and the structure and functioning of the shareholder meetings.
With respect to the Board of Directors, we describe the two-tiered German-style corporate governance structure adopted by Aventis. It consists of a Supervisory Board of independent directors elected by shareholders and a Management Board of top executives selected by the Supervisory Board. The two-tier structure permits oversight of management by representatives of shareholders and employees. Consistent with the German model, the Management Board must prepare an annual management report on the company. At the annual shareholders' meeting, the Supervisory Board must comment on both, the management report and financial statements. However, Aventis borrows from Rhône-Poulenc some other characteristics of the Board which favor shareholders relative to those in Hoechst: a smaller Board size, fewer employees on the Board, and the requirement that Board members must own at least one share in the company.
With respect to the functioning of the shareholder meetings, we find that both Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst were very similar prior to the merger. Aventis. However, rather than combining the two structures, Aventis introduced new provisions that improved the governance structure of both merging companies. For instance, while Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst require a deposit of shares within five and seven days prior to the meeting respectively, Aventis reduces such period to only three days.
Finally, with respect to shareholder protection, the starting point is that Aventis is a corporation formed under the laws of France. Because the merging parties were multinational entities, the levels of creditor protection and rule of law in Aventis are determined by the courts of the country where the corporate assets are located. Moreover, because both Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst had ADRs trading in U.S. markets, matters relating to trading in Aventis ordinary shares or American Depository Shares are justiciable in the courts of the markets in which trading occurs (France, Germany, and the U.S.) Creditor matters and operational matters generally are justiciable by courts in the various jurisdictions in which the claims arise, or in which the defendant is located. With respect to director liability to shareholders or to the corporation, such matters are subject to adjudication by the courts of France, irrespective of the location of the shareholders. Therefore, determining the default legal system applicable to shareholder protection matters is a more direct and focused issue to be addressed. The one-step structure of the merger/exchange allowed stakeholders to "directly invest in Aventis rather than indirectly through Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc as envisaged in the two-step process…" 42 The benefits of this structure also included the immediate unification of "the shareholder base of Hoechst and…Rhône-Poulenc," a faster realization of synergies for Aventis shareholders, and a shorter time schedule for the combination of the companies. 43 Overall, Aventis would own 90 percent of Hoechst, while the remaining 10 percent would be owned by minority shareholders. 
Strategic Rationale
The Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc management cited the geographic fit between the companies, their complementary product mixes and shared entrepreneurial vision as factors that led to the merger. global scale, enhanced innovation potential, strong product portfolio with high growth potential and a promising product pipeline, steady flow of product launches, expanded global sales and marketing forces, and improved cost position through better manufacturing administration and research and development. 47 The realization of these objectives would significantly increase returns for shareholders.
The merging parties described the deal as a "merger of equals" and tried to structure it appropriately. If 100 percent of the shareholders accepted, Hoechst shareholders would end up with a 53 percent stake in Aventis. 48 According to a "merger of equals" analysis by Lazard Freres, Hoechst would contribute 47 percent of sales, 51 percent of EBITA and 46 percent of net income. 49 They also split representation on the management and supervisory boards between the two companies.
Investor Benefits, Synergies, and Synergy Value
Both companies adopted a focus in the 1990s on "higher-margin and higher-growth life science activities." 50 The merger would validate this strategy and create "a pure life sciences entity with the necessary critical mass, the potential for product innovation, and a more effective sales and marketing force" to drive higher growth rates and better earnings per share. 51 The projected gains included annual gross margin improvements of between 0.5 and 1 percent and net margin improvements of 1.5 -2.0 percent from 1999 and 2002. 52 The "earnings impact of synergies [achieved through] substantial operational efficiencies and potential of earnings growth" would drive these gains.
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The companies anticipated about € 1.2 billion per year in direct cost savings and synergies.
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They anticipated € 700 million in savings from sales, general and administrative efficiencies and an additional € 500 million to be split between research and development and drug innovation and approval. 55 Each business segment would realize savings according to their filings. They predicted € 750 million in their pharmaceutical business, € 350 million in their crop science division, and € 100 million in corporate functions. 56 They hoped to apply these savings to "additional product discovery and development activities" that would strengthen Aventis and improve their portfolio. The overall corporate headquarters would be in Strasbourg, France, which gave Aventis a French incorporation. They considered themselves a European multinational, however, and planned to "explore economically feasible possibilities for its transformation into a European stock corporation with corporate domicile in France once such form becomes available." 63 As a French company, they "would benefit from reduced income tax rates through the French regime of worldwide tax consolidation ('régime du benefice consolide')". 64 Former German Hoechst shareholders would also benefit from a French Tax Credit-avoir fiscal-which amounted to 50 percent of the net dividend. 65 Aventis would have a corporate governance structure composed of a ten-member supervisory board and a four-member management board. 66 The role of the two boards is detailed in Section V. Table   6 presents the proposed board members and executive committee at the time of the merger. In this section we analyze the differences between the French Corporate Code and the German Corporate
Code. These dictate the corporate governance systems by default of Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst, respectively. Once we determine the intrinsic differences between the two systems, we characterize the improvements that the two companies had adopted with respect to their default system. In the final section of the paper, we compare the resulting corporate governance structure of Aventis relative to the two original companies.
In what follows, we have used the following data sources. Table 7 summarizes the index of antidirector rights. In addition to the country-specific index we construct a firm-specific index. Whenever the corporate charter is silent with respect to some component of the index, we assign to the firm the value of that component in the corresponding country. This is because the country´s corporate code is the firm´s default system. Otherwise we characterize the index component as described in the corporate charter. This methodology allows us to construct indices of antidirector rights for both Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst.
Our results in Table 7 summarize the main finding of this paper. Rhône-Poulenc, a French company, has an index of antidirector rights which mirrors the one established in the French Corporate
Code. In particular, Rhône-Poulenc system of corporate governance provides to its shareholders the same rights to block decisions by the Board to issue new securities that the French Corporate Code requires.
Because Rhône-Poulenc is silent with respect to Proxy by Mail and the percent of shares to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting, the French system is the default. In total, Rhône-Poulenc has an index of antidirector rights of three.
Hoechst is more stringent that the German Corporate Code. For instance, Hoechst charter has an explicit "one share-one vote" provision and allows proxy voting by mail. These provisions, however, are not required by the German Corporate code. Interestingly, it also declares the absence of limits in the directors' discretion to issue new capital. Finally, because the charter is silent on the percent of shares required to call an extraordinary meeting, the German system becomes the default system (five percent), and Hoechst has a total index of antidirector rights of three. Therefore Hoechst provisions are more protective of shareholders than the prescriptions in the German Corporate law.
As the previous section established, Aventis is a French company. In the absence of any contract between the merging parties, Aventis should have, by default, an antidirector rights index of three. Table   7 shows instead that Aventis has an index of four. Not only Aventis' charter borrows the "one share-one vote" provision from Hoechst. It also recognizes that proxy by mail is allowed, even though the French law already incorporates such provision. In sum, Aventis' index of andirector rights is constructed upon the default French system (the percent of share capital required to call an extraordinary meeting and proxy by mail), some features of the Rhône-Poulenc system (preemptive rights to new issues), and some features of the Hoechst system (one share-one vote,). Therefore, by adapting the most protective provisions from each of the two companies, Aventis improves the protection given to minority shareholders, relative to the original companies.
Because the La Porta et al. (1998) index of antidirector rights is only a summary indicator, in what follows we describe in details the main differences between the French and German systems.
The French and German Systems
The main difference between the French Corporate code and the German Corporate code regards the structure of the Board of Directors. The German law only permits a two-tier structure while the French law allows a choice between a unitary structure and a two-tier structure. This option was introduced under the 1966 legislation reform and is based on the German Corporate Law. Most French companies, though, have the unitary structure. 
Unitary system
As stated above, the unitary system is allowed in France only, and it is comparable to the U.S. structure of the Board of Directors. In that sense, the unitary system has a Board of Directors or Counseil d'adminitration whose members are elected at the general meeting of shareholders. The law states that this Board is composed by at least three and no more than twelve members (24 in case of a merger), which can be either individuals or corporations. According to the law, members of the Board can be of any nationality unless the by-laws of the company provide something different. There are some requisites stated in the law to be eligible as member of the Board. Some of the most important requisites are:
• Lawyers, Notaries, and Accountants are not allowed in the board
• Each director has to hold a required number of shares when appointed In Germany, the Co-determination Act-introduced after the World War II and expanded in the 1970s-states that companies with fewer than 2,000 employees should have 2/3 of the Supervisory Board elected by shareholders and 1/3 elected by the employees. In companies with more than 2,000 employees the ratio is 1/2 elected by the shareholders and 1/2 by the employees. 76 The general rule in 
General Meetings are called by the Management Board in both countries but the Supervisory
Board has the power to do so if necessary. In the German law, shareholders holding 5% or more of the stated capital may request the Management board to call a meeting of shareholders. In France, however, shareholders owing at least 10% can do so. Notice of the call of the meeting must be given by publication in the respective Gazettes provided in each of the two laws. While the French Law requires a minimum quorum of a quarter of the shares outstanding to hold a meeting, the German law does not require such quorum. In both countries resolutions are passed by the simple majority rule unless otherwise specified in the articles. Both laws appoint the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and
Chairman of the shareholders meetings.
Corporate Governance of Aventis.
The corporate governance structures at Rhone-Poulenc, Hoechst, and the resulting Aventis are quite different. Even though the format and sections of the by-laws of Aventis are more like those of RhonePoulenc, the corporate governance structure per se is more like that of Hoechst.
Supervisory Board/Board of Directors
On the one hand, Rhône-Poulenc was established in France, under the predominant unitary system. This system is comparable to the structure in place in the US. [ INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] Table 8 shows that, in six out of 11 features of the Board of Directors that we investigate, Aventis borrows the alternative that is the most protective with respect to shareholders. Within the remaining five features, two of them are almost similar to the most protective system (ownership limit to become a member of the board, and frequency of meetings), while the other three are hard to classify (majority rules, age limit, and fees).
Management Board
Rhône While at Hoechst members of the Management Board did not have any restrictions on age, at Aventis they cannot serve if they are older than 65. This restriction seems to be carried over from the Rhône-Poulenc restriction imposed over the members of the Board of Directors.
Decisions of the Management Board are passed by the simple majority rule and, while at Hoechst the Chairman had casting vote in case of equality of votes, this power has been removed from the Aventis' Chairman. Additionally, at Hoechst there were no limitations regarding the decisions made by the Management Board, while at Aventis, the French law requires some decisions to be approved by the Supervisory Board, as well as any decision that is of major strategic importance.
In both cases, Hoechst and Aventis, members of the Management Board are entitled to attend Supervisory Board meetings when considered necessary.
Shareholders' Meetings
Shareholders' meetings at Rhône-Poulenc were called according to the French law, as well as those of Aventis. Hoechst's general meetings were called according to the German law.
Holders of Rhône-Poulenc shares had to deposit their shares at least five days prior to the general meeting to have the right to attend. Hoechst shareholders had to deposit their shares no later than the end of the 7 th day before the meeting. Aventis has the same restrictions with Rhône-Poulenc but reduces the term to two days before the meeting.
At Rhône-Poulenc notice of the general meeting's had to be published in the French Bulletin des Annonces Légales Obligatories (BALO) and had to comply with all the information required in the French Law. The case of Hoechst was similar but complying with German Law. Aventis' notices are more like those of Rhône-Poulenc but they introduce new technological ways of communicating meetings, such as, e-mail and any other telecommunication tools recently developed.
All three corporations allow proxies. Rhône-Poulenc allows also mail voting and Aventis introduces videoconference and telecommunication tools as means to vote. The general rule is that each share carries one vote but Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst had special multiple voting rights depending on the year in which the shares were acquired. Aventis does not have any of multiple voting rights. All resolutions at general meetings are passed by the simple majority rule at Rhône-Poulenc, Hoechst and Aventis.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] Table 9 summarizes the requirements and procedures of the shareholder meetings in Rhône-Poulenc, Hoechst, and Aventis. Although there are minor differences between Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst prior to the merger, we can conclude that the resulting requirements at Aventis are even more stringent than in the founding companies.
Conclusion
Extensive academic research has documented a strong association between good investor protection and measures of financial development. In the area of cross-border mergers, Bris and Cabolis (2004) present evidence that shareholders of a company that is acquired by a firm operating in a more protective corporate governance environment realize substantial gains. The use of large sample of cross-border mergers, necessarily abstracts from issues of private contracting between merging parties. Nevertheless, the design of the corporate governance framework that the new merged entity adopts is of crucial importance, and it is addressed in this paper.
We explore in detail the corporate governance provisions in Rhône-Poulenc, a French company, and Hoechst, a German firm, and the resulting structure after the two firms merged in 1999 to create Aventis, legally a French corporation. We show that, despite the nationality of the firm, the corporate governance structure of Aventis is a combination of the corporate governance systems of Hoechst and Rhône-Poulenc. Indeed Aventis adopted some of the features of the Hoechst system that were more protective to investors than similar provisions in the Rhône-Poulenc corporate governance code.
We study two main characteristics of the Aventis code of corporate governance: the organization of the Board of Directors, and the structure and functioning of the shareholder meetings. With respect to the Board of Directors, we first describe how Aventis adopted a two-tiered German-style corporate governance structure comprised of a Supervisory Board and a Management Board of top executives selected by the Supervisory Board. However, Aventis borrowed from Rhône-Poulenc some other characteristics of the Board which favor shareholders relative to those in Hoechst.
With respect to the functioning of the shareholder meetings, we find that both Rhône-Poulenc and Hoechst were very similar prior to the merger. Aventis, however, rather than combining the two structures, introduced improved provisions that were not present in the merging companies.
In sum, our paper describes a case of corporate governance convergence through a cross-border merger where the resulting entity is more protective of shareholders than the two original firms, and where the new entity improves the default legal system prescribed in the national Corporate Code.
At the time this paper is being written, Aventis' shareholders have accepted a friendly offer to merge with Sanofi-Synthelabo, its French rival. 78 The French government has welcomed the deal between the country's two main pharmaceutical groups, which would lead to the creation of the world's third largest company behind U.S. giant Pfizer and Britain's GlaxoSmithKline.
A natural extension to our study is an analysis of the effects that the improved corporate governance of Aventis relative to the minimum legal requirements have played in the consummation of the deal. Bris and Cabolis (2004) show that shareholders of a company acquired by a more protective firm realize substantial gains . In their paper, however, the large sample of cross-border mergers that they study does now allow for incorporating the role of private contracting among the merging parties. This important issue in the study of corporate governance is clearly addressed in this paper. 
